Tuong Vu on Vietnam in Comparison to China

Can you talk a little bit about how the Vietnamese regime has attempted to prevent the internet from engendering free political expression and civil society activity in Vietnam? How successful has it been in this?

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Vu: Since 2012, and especially since 2016, the Vietnamese regime has waged a war against both free political expression and civil society. From a few arrests every year before 2012, the annual number now is in double digits, and prison sentences of 5 years or more are frequently handed out today (The Project 88 keeps a list and timeline of arrests and trials since 2007. See https://the88project.org/timeline/). The authorities enacted a draconian Cybersecurity Law in 2018 that mimicked the Chinese Cybersecurity Law and a new press law in 2019 that forced the closure of quasi-private news websites such as Zing News that had grown under the radar for many years prior (Huong Nguyen, "The Press Plan of 2025 and the Rise of Digital Authoritarianism in Vietnam." US-Vietnam Review, December 23, 2023. Available at: https://usvietnam.uoregon.edu/en/the-press-plan-of-2025-and-the-rise-of-digital-authoritarianism-in-vietnam/).

In 2021, the editors of two popular but unregistered online non-state media, Bao Sach [Clean Newspaper] (Truong Chau Huu Danh, Nguyen Phuoc Trung Bao, Doan Kien Giang, Nguyen Thanh Nha) and Viet Nam Thoi Bao [Vietnam Times] (Pham Chi Dung, Nguyen Tuong Thuy, Le Huu Minh Tuan) were arrested and given heavy prison sentences. Pham Chi Dung, the editor of Viet Nam Thoi Bao and president of the Association of Independent Journalists, was sentenced to 14 years in prison.

The Cybersecurity Law was followed by the authorities' successful push to force Google and Facebook to comply. Both have now routinely obeyed orders from the Vietnamese government to divulge the identities of their users and to shut down or suspended accounts at the request of the authorities. Thanks to their cooperation, the government has been able to arrest numerous bloggers, Facebookers, and Youtubers who dared to be critical of government policy. Some of these activists, such as Nguyen Lan Thang and Le Dung ("Vova”), have actually been quiet for several years, but now share the fate of others who are active.

Since 2021, the authorities also began to repress registered quasi-civil society organizations that are active on such issues as gender equality, children's rights, environmental protection. These organizations have always operated within the law and served to receive and distribute development aid from foreign donors. This crackdown mimicked the approach used by Vladimir Putin in Russia and Xi Jinping in China. Several leaders of these organizations, such as Mai Phan Loi, Dang Dinh Bach, Hoang Thu Hong, Ngo Thi To Nhien, and Nguy Thi Khanh, have been arrested and sentenced to several years of imprisonment on dubious tax evasion charges. These arrests triggered an outcry from Western governments and international organizations, leading to a couple of them being released early. Several remain in prison, and many have escaped by fleeing abroad.

The authorities' draconian approach since 2016 has terrorized many civil society activists in Vietnam and silenced most critics of the government--for now. The regime's success may be short-lived, as it is simply driving activists into exile or underground but not stopping them from engaging in activism. At the same time, Vietnam is creating tensions with many Western governments, which will eventually affect Western investment in Vietnam.

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Has Communist Vietnam ever faced major protests that threatened the regime in the manner of the June 1989 protests in China? If so, how did it survive?

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Vu: No, it has not. The largest protest, which took place in June 2018 against the draft laws for Special Zones and for Cybersecurity, involved tens of thousands of demonstrators in several cities in Vietnam. The protest was spontaneous and coordinated by loose networks of individuals and groups who were opposed to those draft laws. Thousands of protesters were arrested, although most would later be released. The government rescinded the draft law for Special Zones for some time but went on to enact the Cybersecurity Law.

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How significant is the role of communist ideology in Vietnamese politics, education, and culture today? Has ideology largely become irrelevant as capitalist reforms have taken hold, as in China?

 

Vu: As in China, ideology has become largely irrelevant in Vietnam. Aside from old folks, many of whom were veterans and loyal Party members, few now believe in communism. Young Communist Party members see seeking party membership as a career move to be groomed for higher positions. The Party still speaks in ideological language, makes cadres and students learn Marxism-Leninism, ties the past and future of the Party and the country to that ideology, and punishes those who attempt to challenge the ideology directly or indirectly, especially among students, teachers, writers, scholars, and artists. Most students simply memorize ideological lessons to graduate but do not care. It is the same for other groups in society.

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Did Nguyen Phu Trong wield comparable power to Xi Jinping? Why or why not?

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Vu: No Vietnamese leaders since market reform have wielded comparable power to Xi Jinping, including Nguyen Phu Trong, who just passed away. The new leader, General To Lam, wields as much power as Nguyen Phu Trong, as observed in his rapid rise by taking down one competitor after another. To Lam has also been able to place his proteges in key positions, including the Minister of Public Security and Chief of Staff of the Central Party Office. Given the power of his patronage network, over time he should be able to control the Party's agenda, policy, and personnel. Still, To Lam needs more time to consolidate his power, and at present he's still weaker than Trong. In the next two years of preparation for the next Party Congress to be held in 2026, it is expected that more members of his team will take over other important positions.

Another important change with the passing of Nguyen Phu Trong is the rise of four-star General Luong Cuong, formerly the Political Commissar of the People's Army of Vietnam. Gen. Cuong, who was just made State President, is ideologically as conservative as Nguyen Phu Trong and To Lam. Yet it is still unclear whether he represents the interests and rising power of the military in the top leadership or is simply an ally with To Lam.

To Lam and Luong Cuong have their weaknesses, though. To Lam has spent all of his career in the Ministry of Public Security and does not have a local regional base or experience in diplomacy, economic governance, or propaganda. He must depend on others whose loyalty may be suspect. To Lam is also scandal-prone leader. He traveled to Slovakia to lead a secret operation to kidnap a corrupt Vietnamese official who was applying for asylum in Germany, creating a serious diplomatic row. To Lam, whose image of being fed a piece of gold-leaf beef steak worth more than $1,000 by celebrity chef Salt Bae at a luxurious London restaurant was widely circulated online, is viewed by many in Vietnam as extremely corrupt. His rivals may be simply gathering their forces to oust him when he makes mistakes.

As the military's Political Commissar, General Luong Cuong had little battlefield experience. He might have only weak support from within the military. He's especially vulnerable if viewed as not sufficiently assertive toward China. He is a former protege of Gen. Ngo Xuan Lich, who was also the military's Political Commissar who rose to become the Minister of Defense during 2012-2021. Gen. Ngo Xuan Lich was despised by many veterans as a general who did not know how to read a military map. Given such a weakness, Gen. Cuong may not go much further in his political career.​

​To what extent has leadership turnover in Vietnam translated into changes in policy? For example, have any previous leaders in the current era been appreciably less conservative or less China-friendly than Nguyen Phu Trong?

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Vu: Previous leaders in the current era were less doctrinaire, at least in the way they talked, but were not appreciably less conservative or less China-friendly than Nguyen Phu Trong. The same applies to the current duo, Generals To Lam and Luong Cuong.

It's unlikely that Vietnam's foreign and domestic policies will change greatly under the new leadership. At the same time, Vietnamese society is different, as is the international context. To Lam and Luong Cuong may need more time to consolidate their power, and at present they are more sensitive to pressure from below, within, or outside. They both lack experience in diplomacy and may have to rely on professional staff for assistance.

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In your article on the strengths and vulnerabilities of the surviving communist regimes in Asia, you advanced a fascinating argument that those strengths and vulnerabilities "are not to be explained only by domestic factors but should be viewed in a regional perspective.” For readers who have not read your article, could you talk about the extent to which communist regimes in Asia are mutually supportive and interdependent today?

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Vu: The Vietnamese Communist Party continues to hold regular meetings on ideological matters and governance strategies with the Chinese Communist Party. The same goes for the Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Defense, and so on, at various levels, on various technical matters, sometimes in public but sometimes not. Vietnam continues to send officials and seed cadres (cadres selected for future promotion to top national leadership positions) for training in China. Vietnam has copied Chinese strategies to open party membership to entrepreneurs, to suppress criticism of the government through the Cybersecurity Law, and more recently to crack down on civil society organizations and activities.

Those close, even intimate exchanges between Vietnam and China also take place between Vietnam and Laos, and to a lesser extent Vietnam and Cambodia. Vietnam may still have troops and security advisors in Laos; still trains many of Laos' students, cadres, and officials who went to Vietnam under the Vietnamese state or Communist Party's sponsorship; and still holds regular meetings on ideological, security, military, and economic affairs. How much aid Vietnam is providing Laos is not known, but it certainly is not insignificant. In contrast, Vietnam's relationship with Cambodia is both less close and less well-known. The relationship is very sensitive for the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP), as the opposition still stigmatizes the CPP as Vietnam's lackey. The level of secret support Vietnam is providing to Cambodia is likely much less than Laos, and information is much more protected from outsiders.
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In the same article, you noted that “in Vietnam, the Ministry of Public Security is assigning professional security personnel to work at the commune level, and is in the process of forming a new security force of 750,000 at the same level nationwide that combines various ad hoc local militias.” What is the reason for these local militias in the first place? Why do they exist alongside the military? Is the Vietnamese regime consolidating these militias because it feels that the military is inadequate for its protection in some way?

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Vu: The local militias have always been an integral part of the communist regime in Vietnam as it carried out a radical communist revolution throughout society for decades. In the revolution, it had to deal with numerous and formidable class and political enemies, from religious authorities to landlords and entrepreneurs to former colonial or bourgeois government elites. The peasants who refused to give up their land to join the agricultural cooperatives were also a kind of class enemy that needed to be suppressed. During the war, those militias served the additional functions of recruiting for the military and organizing local air defense and guerrilla teams, while the military was sent to the front.

The defense doctrine of the Vietnamese state is centered on the concept of "all people's defense and security," meaning that defense is organized at every level and in every place to ensure everyone's participation. No place and no field of social activities are to be left out of the national defense plan, and no one is allowed to avoid being part of it. This doctrine grew out of the strategy of revolutionary warfare and is also known as "people's war." In this doctrine, the responsibility of defense is divided between the (revolutionary) army for external (imperialist) enemies and the local militias for local defense (against class and ideological enemies at local levels).

Defense covers the security of not only the country but also the communist regime. Military officers swear loyalty first to the Communist Party and then to the State. The professional military is organized only down to district level, and the militias and local police are responsible for security at the subdistrict level. Local militias are mostly paid by local authorities and their training is minimal. The new policy is to increase centralized control and coordination of these local militias in the face of rising resistance to the regime across society. Besides their normal role of safeguarding the security of state officials and assets, local militias have been routinely employed to suppress local protests, provide intelligence about local people and conditions to the national police, and guard the houses of dissidents.

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You spoke in the same article about pro-American sectors of Vietnamese government and society. How large or influential are these sectors? Do they have any support or representation at the highest echelons of the Vietnamese government?

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Vu: Pro-American sentiments are very high and widespread among Vietnamese. Many admire the United States’ dynamic culture, its wealthy economy, and its liberal politics. Others simply think the US can help Vietnam cope with the Chinese threat. No research has been done, but the sentiments are likely stronger in the South, in the cities, and among youth. The VCP's leadership has been dominated by old men of Northern origins. The most powerful members of the elite have built their careers in the Party, the Communist Youth League, and the propaganda, military and public security apparatuses. These organizations give priority to ideological loyalty and the regime's security needs more than anything else. Some leaders are practical and see benefits in improved relations with the U.S., but they tend to be in the minority. Pro-American sentiments may influence state policy in the future, but up to now they have lacked official sponsorship, and their influence tends to be limited.

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You have spoken in the past about how experts on China often have a limited (or even inaccurate) grasp of Vietnamese history and politics. What are some things about Vietnam that you think China scholars should be aware of?

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Vu: From a broad perspective, Vietnam and China have quite similar political-economic systems, in part because Vietnam's communist leaders (like some of their predecessors in Vietnamese history) have tried to emulate China at various times in the past. Yet differences exist that reflect the different history and conditions between the two countries. There are a few obvious differences, such as the degree of power concentration both at the central level and by individual leaders (which is much greater in China). Another difference is the degree of dependence on foreign relations (as in trade, investment, aid, and remittance), which is much, much higher in Vietnam. The scale of ethnic problems is also much larger in China simply due to the size of ethnic populations and their territories. There are also less obvious but important differences, such as the close relationship between Vietnam and the Soviet bloc in the 1970s-1990s, which led to the still strong domination of Soviet- or Soviet bloc-trained leaders not only in the political and economic systems but also in the universities and in literature.

Overall, China is much, much, much better-researched and better-known than Vietnam, even though Vietnam is much smaller. Pre-communist China was much more developed than colonial Vietnam in general. Communist China opened up to the world in the late 1970s, while Vietnam did not until the late 1990s. During the 1980s, US-China relations were close, while US-Vietnam relations remain guarded even today. Pioneering Chinese scholars who studied in the West in the 1980s were instrumental in facilitating the development of social scientific research in China. As a great power, China has attracted ample attention and resources for research relative to Vietnam. Scholarship on Vietnam is limited not only due to the small number of researchers, but also due to the politics of the Vietnam War, which deeply affected scholarship because many scholars wanted to justify certain US policies. What is challenging for China experts is perhaps challenging for others.

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